Lies
Leading to the Iraq War
by Nile Stanton
March
16, 2023
Let's take a quick
stroll down memory lane.
Twenty years ago, the
war drums were pounding
more loudly than they
had in many years. A
crescendo that was about
to explode had begun in
earnest months before.
President George W.
Bush:
The danger to our
country is grave.
The danger to our
country is
growing. The Iraqi
regime possesses
biological and
chemical weapons.
The Iraqi regime
is building the
facilities
necessary to make
more biological
and chemical
weapons.
Remarks
to Congressional
Leaders in the Rose
Garden,
September 26, 2002.
The Iraqi regime
possesses
biological and
chemical weapons,
is rebuilding the
facilities to make
more, and
according to the
British
government, could
launch a
biological or
chemical attack in
as little as 45
minutes after the
order is given.
Radio
Address to the Nation,
September 28, 2002.
In
defiance of pledges
to the United
Nations, Iraq has
stockpiled
biological and
chemical weapons,
and is rebuilding
the facilities used
to make more of
those weapons.
Radio
Address to the Nation,
October 5, 2002.
Vice President Dick
Cheney:
The Iraqi regime has
in fact been very
busy enhancing its
capabilities in the
field of chemical
and biological
agents. And they
continue to pursue
the nuclear program
they began so many
years ago. These are
not weapons for the
purpose of defending
Iraq; these are
offensive weapons
for the purpose of
inflicting death on
a massive scale,
developed so that
Saddam can hold the
threat over the head
of anyone he
chooses, in his own
region or beyond....
Simply stated, there
is no doubt that
Saddam Hussein now
has weapons of mass
destruction.
Speech
to the VFW National
Convention, August
26, 2002.
Secretary
of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld:
There's no debate in
the world as to
whether they have
those weapons.
There's no debate in
the world as to
whether they're
continuing to
develop and acquire
them.... We all know
that. A trained ape
knows that.
Media
Roundtable,
September 13, 2002.
We
know where they are.
They're in the area
around Tikrit and
Baghdad and east,
west, south and
north somewhat.
ABC
Interview, March 30,
2003.
In addition to making
general claims to the
effect that Iraq had
chemical and biological
weapons and could deploy
them quickly and that we
couldn't wait for Iraq's
threat to be "manifested
in the form of a mushroom
cloud," the Bush
Administration touted
several very specific
claims as well.
Here are three prominent
ones:
(1) It
claimed that
documents showed that Iraq
had attempted to purchase
yellowcake uranium from
Niger, but those
documents were promptly
demonstrated to be crude
forgeries.
(2) It
asserted that Iraq
had mobile biological
weapons labs, but it
turned out that they
were hydrogen generators
for meteorological
balloons, sold to Iraq
by the British.
(3) It
announced that we'd
found evidence that Iraq
had imported aluminum
tubes that could only be
used for uranium
enrichment, but it was
quickly established that
they were for Iraqi
rocket casings exactly
as Iraq had claimed.
The now famous Downing
Street Memo of July
23, 2002, the official
minutes (leaked to the
London Sunday Times
and first published on May
1, 2005) of a briefing by
Sir Richard Dearlove, head
of MI-6, to British Prime
Minister Tony Blair and
his top national security
officials, stated in part:
C [Dearlove]
reported on his
recent talks in
Washington. There
was a perceptible
shift in attitude.
Military action was
now seen as
inevitable. Bush
wanted to remove
Saddam, through
military action,
justified by the
conjunction of
terrorism and WMD.
But the
intelligence and
facts were being
fixed around the
policy.
(Emphasis
added.)
~~~~~
On March 19, 2003, the
United States initiated a
full scale military attack
on Iraq.
The previous month the
Bush Administration had
presented its case to the
Security Council of the
U.N. through Secretary of
State Colin Powell.
Thereafter, the weapons
inspections reports of
Hans Blix (head the U.N.
Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission)
and Mohamed ElBaradei
(head of the International
Atomic Energy Agency) to
the U.N. Security Council
in early March of 2003
pointedly noted that while
Iraq had dithered and
dallied in their
"cooperation" with
inspectors for a long
time, in the five weeks
preceding their testimony,
the inspections teams had
total cooperation, were
able to make unannounced
spot checks at any time
and at any place they
liked, had inspected all
of the 400-plus
"suspected" WMD cites
suggested by the CIA, and
had found no prohibited
weapons, although more
time was needed to verify
things.
Blix and ElBaradei thanked
the United States and
credited the build-up of
the U.S. military force in
the area as having done
much to secure Iraq's
cooperation. They also
implored that the
inspections be allowed to
continue. Then, when
the U.N. Security
Council was clearly not
going to approve of the
use of force to "disarm"
Iraq, the U.S. withdrew
its resolution proposing
that, ordered the
inspectors out of Iraq,
and invaded.
Thereafter, the Iraq
Survey Group's Kay
Report and subsequent
Duelfer Report both
concluded that there were
no WMDs.
In April of 2005, an
Associated Press release
briefly summarizing the
Duelfer Report began: "In
his final word, the CIA’s
top weapons inspector in
Iraq said Monday that the
hunt for weapons of mass
destruction has 'gone as
far as feasible' and has
found nothing, closing an
investigation into the
purported programs of
Saddam Hussein that were
used to justify the 2003
invasion."
The United States demanded
that Iraq surrender
weapons it not have, then
invaded when the weapons
were not produced.
Was Saddam Hussein
actually adequately
contained before 9/11?
Yes, he was.
Consider: Speaking at a
press conference in Cairo,
Egypt, on February 24,
2001, then Secretary of
State Colin Powell, said
this in partial
answer to the first
question posed to him:
We should constantly
be reviewing our
policies, constantly
be looking at those
sanctions [against
Iraq] to make sure
that they are
directed toward that
purpose. That
purpose is every bit
as important now as
it was ten years ago
when we began it.
And frankly they
have worked. He
[Saddam Hussein] has
not developed any
significant
capability with
respect to weapons
of mass destruction.
He is unable to
project conventional
power against his
neighbors. So in
effect, our policies
have strengthened
the security of the
neighbors of Iraq,
and these are
policies that we are
going to keep in
place....
In early 2001, National
Security Advisor
Condoleezza Rice made
statements to the same
effect as well, that
Saddam was contained.
However, in early March
of 2003, Powell made
detailed factual
assertions before the
Security Council
concerning Iraq's
alleged weapons
capabilities and plans
to use them. (It appears
to me that he, like many
others, got hoodwinked
by the neoconservative
propaganda machine.)
Later, Powell sadly
admitted that most of
his claims before the
Security Council turned
out to be "false or
misleading." What he'd
said in Cairo ultimately
turned out to be much
closer to the truth.
What happened?
When the Bush
administration didn't
like the intelligence
reports it was getting,
in August 2002, it
created the White
House Iraq Group
(WHIG), overseen by
Stephen Hadley. Soon
thereafter, Paul
Wolfowitz and Douglas
Feith created the Office
of Special Plans
(OSP) inside
the Pentagon to
coordinate with
Hadley's group to
filter-massage-create
the sort of "evidence"
the administration
wanted to justify the
U.S. invasion.
The result? - Vast
numbers of deaths,
widespread disease, the
destruction of
innumerable homes,
hospitals, schools,
water delivery systems
and sewer systems,
horrific pain, financial
ruin and more.
Don't be fooled
again.
___________________________
* Nile
Stanton lives in
southern Spain. He
was a professor for
the University of
Maryland University
College for 20
years, where he
taught U.S. active
duty service members
on U.S. military
bases in Spain,
Italy, Bosnia, and
(mostly) Greece as
well as online to
troops throughout
Europe and Asia. The
course he taught
most often (32
iterations) was the
upper-level
government course
called “Law,
Morality, and War.”
Thereafter, he
taught for the
University of New
England at its
Tangier, Morocco,
campus for two
years, where his
signature course was
“War and Public
Health.” He was born
and raised a Quaker
and tends to examine
the excuses for war
and lack of
diplomacy more
carefully and from a
different
perspective than
many people.
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